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The Subcommittee on Fairness in the Criminal Justice System has requested analysis of 
several aspects of the criminal justice system in the State of Delaware to determine whether 
reforms in policing, prosecution, adjudication and imprisonment can be accomplished in a 
way that would reduce racial disparities, while not increasing the incidence of violent crime. 
This memorandum summarizes existing scholarly research on police stops; pretrial 
detention; charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing; and alternatives to incarceration.  For 
each topic, the memo surveys the extent to which each of these contributes to racial 
disparities as well as inaccuracies in criminal justice; identifies reforms that have worked 
elsewhere to ameliorate these problems; and considers the extent to which these reforms are 
compatible with preserving and improving public safety.  The memorandum concludes with 
a brief discussion of recent scholarship that both highlights larger social factors that 
contribute to disparity and identifies programs and initiatives outside of the criminal justice 
system that might reduce racial disparities within the system. 
 The memorandum offers the following avenues of reform for consideration by the 
Subcommittee: 
 
1. Collect comprehensive data on discretionary stops, searches, and seizures by police and 
make these data available for expert analysis.  
2. Reduce arrests and prosecutions by substituting tickets and diversion. 
3. After arrest, make release on recognizance pending trial the default, and ensure 
appearance through reminder systems. 
4. If an arrestee presents a substantial risk, impose the least restrictive conditions 
necessary to mitigate it. 
5. Improve process:  Ensure access to counsel in pretrial release hearings, and accelerate 
proceedings for detained persons. 
6. Change prosecutors’ incentives in plea-bargaining. 
7. Ensure effective representation for indigent defendants. 
8. Make charging and plea-bargaining transparent and accountable. 
9. Tether sentences to culpability.  
10. Establish objective, needs-based criteria for participation in specialized courts, and collect 
and analyze demographic data on participants. 
 
Each of these recommendations is discussed in greater detail below.  
 
 
I. Police Stops 
 
From the time that the Supreme Court authorized stop and frisk intrusions under the 
Fourth Amendment, this practice became an integral part of a larger pro-active policing 
paradigm aimed at preventing violent crime.  The emphasis on prevention has encompassed 
a number of theories including “broken windows” and “quality of life” policing that have 
 
 
become standards in many departments.1  Advocates of this approach have credited the new 
policing with the sharp reductions in crime that we have witnessed over the past 20 years.  
Critics, however, have challenged this assumption and have pointed to significant 
constitutional problems in the manner in which stop and frisk has been employed.   
 
Contribution to Racial Disparities and Inaccuracies in Criminal Justice 
 
In many police departments that collect and maintain reliable data on stop and frisk 
and car stop practices, analysis has shown systemic Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
violations—stops and frisks conducted without the requisite reasonable suspicion and racial 
disparities that are not explained by non-racial factors.  Further, studies and litigation call 
into question the claim that high rates of stop and frisk reduce violent crime and deadly 
weapon possession.   
In Terry v. Ohio2 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a person who was 
stopped for investigation by the police could be frisked if the officer had reasonable suspicion 
to believe that the person was “armed and dangerous.”3  Over the past forty-seven years, the 
Supreme Court has expanded the Terry doctrine in several significant respects.  First, the 
Court has permitted stops of all persons who are reasonably suspected of any criminal 
activity, including possessory offenses and “quality of life” and traffic violations, thus 
significantly widening the scope of this practice.4  Second, the Court has approved stops and 
frisks on the assumption that certain conduct is predictive or associated with criminal 
behavior, but has rarely required an empirical basis for these judgments, many of which 
                                                          
1 There is a vast literature on these issues, much of which is responsive to the early writings of James Q. 
Wilson, see VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968) and Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1982, at 29 
(with George L. Kelling).  For a sample of responses, that discuss stop and frisk practices in the context of 
proactive policing, see Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan Jackson, & Avital Mentovich, The Consequences of Being an 
Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of Proactive Police Contact, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming); 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 
1990’s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004); David 
Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate: The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frist in New York City, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/590/; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSON FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL (2012); Tracey L. Meares, 
The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANNUAL REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 335 (2014); David F. Greenberg, 
Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Methodological Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154 (2013); David Weisburd, Cody 
W. Telep, & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to New York City Crime Drop, 31 
JUST. Q. 129 (2013); Jeffrey Belllin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of 
New York City Stop and Frisk, 94 BOSTON L. REV. 1495 (2014); Andrew Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken 
Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. LAW 112 (2104); John E. Eck 
& Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduce Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE 
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 228-45 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Waldman eds., 2d ed. 2006); John MacDonald, 
Jeffrey Fagan, & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City 
(Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-468, 2015); Bernard Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: 
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 SUPREME 
COURT REV. 733 (2000). 
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3 Id. at 27, 30.   
4 See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009); Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972). 
 
 
involve conduct that is entirely consistent with innocent behavior.5  For example, the Court 
has permitted stops and frisks on vague and subjective standards such as nervousness, officer 
experience, furtive movements, and suspicious activity.6  While the Court has cautioned 
against use of characteristics that would permit frequent stops of a “very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers,”7 its cases over the years have failed to cabin police stop and 
frisk discretion.   
The vagueness of the factors that may justify stops and frisks increases the risk that 
police will act on implicit biases in deciding whether there is sufficient suspicion for forcible 
intervention.  If police associate racial minorities with criminal conduct where the same 
actions by whites are not be regarded as suspicious, or if they simply consider race or 
ethnicity as a surrogate for criminal conduct, even on a sub-conscious level, bias may be a 
determinative factor.8 
Similar problems arise in the context of traffic stops, although there are some 
important distinctions between traffic stops and pedestrian stop and frisks.  First, whereas 
many jurisdictions capture little to no data on pedestrian stops, most collect at least some 
basic data regarding traffic stops, though often not sufficient to enable careful analysis of 
race effects.  Second, almost all traffic stops are with cause, at least from the perspective of 
the police, as traffic laws provide extraordinary discretion to the police in making these stops.  
Indeed, on most highways, police will observe almost every car at some point engaged in 
driving that will authorize a stop.  Finally, and of critical importance, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that pre-textual stops of drivers--that is, stops made primarily for law enforcement 
reasons other than the traffic violation--do not offend the Fourth Amendment, even if done 
in a racially discriminatory manner.9 
Many jurisdictions do not collect or publish data demonstrating how these legal 
standards are applied in practice.10  For those that do collect data, there is widespread 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (conduct that appears to be innocent may still 
provide reasonable suspicion based on the “totality of circumstances”). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 502 (1983) 
(nervousness a factor contributing to a finding of reasonable suspicion); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 314 
(6th Cir. 2009) (sitting in a car for an extended period may add to reasonable suspicion);United States v. Logan,        
(6th Cir. 2013) (presence in a high crime area); United States v. Himmelwright, 406 F. Supp. 889, 892-93 (1975) 
(suspect’s “unusually calm” demeanor supported the finding of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Briggs, 
720 F.3d 1281, 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2013) (suspect’s evasive or erratic movements are part of the totality of the 
circumstances); Jane Bombauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 505 (2015).  On the question of the relevancy 
and characteristics of a “high crime area,” see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth 
Amendment: Redrawing “High Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L. REV. 179 (2011); United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“just as a man with a hammer sees 
every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime area”). 
7 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam). 
8 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011); Robert 
Myers, Challenges to Terry for the 21st Century, 81 MISS. L. J. 937 (2013); Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, 
Perceptions, Consequences and “Discrimination”: One Puzzle about Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO 
STATE J. CRIM. L. 181 (2014); Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald, & Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407 (2005).     
9 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  The Court did rule that such stops would violate the Fourth 
Amendment but provided no guidance as to how such violations might be remedied. 
10 As most police departments do not maintain data regarding investigative stops we often lack the basic 
facts necessary for constitutional or social policy analysis: how many stops and frisks are conducted, what 
 
 
evidence of significant disparities in rates with which minorities are stopped, questioned, and 
searched.11  Concerns about such disparities have prompted investigations and litigation 
focusing on Fourteenth Amendment issues in a number of communities. 
                                                          
number of cases involve stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion, what is the “hit-rate” (seizures of 
evidence; arrests); are the hit- rates racially disproportionate, and what is the relationship of stop and frisk 
practices to crime rates.  See David Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New 
York City, 16 J. LEG. & PUB. POLICY 833 (2013).  Scholarly analysis and critiques of the Terry doctrine that have 
been published without reference to this data have ranged from high accolades, e.g., Tracey Meares, 
Programming Errors, 82 CHICAGO L. REV. 159 (2015); Steven A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect 
Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911 (1998); John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 749, 839 (1998) (“many think of Terry  .   .    .   as a sensible balancing of public interests in law 
enforcement against relatively minor intrusions on personal freedoms);  Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and 
Torture Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities, 58 OHIO J. CRIM. L. 57 (2014); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and The Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH.L. REV. 299 (2010), to strong 
criticism, Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 
1 (1994); Scott E. Sunby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1133 (1998).  Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment:  Race, Citizenship, and the 
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C. R. C. L. L. REV. 1, 30-35 (2011); Sherry F. Colb, The Quantitative Dimension of 
Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1648-63 (1998); Frank Rudy Cooper, The 
UnBalanced Fourth Amendment:  A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling, and Arvizu, 47 VIL. L. 
REV. 851 (2002); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2059-
72 (2011). 
11 Many studies and litigation have shown racially disproportionate stops, searches, and citations of Black 
drivers and pedestrians, with hit-rates that are lower than for their White counterparts.  See, e.g., State v. Soto, 
734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting that the statistical disparities between African-
American and white motorists stopped for traffic offenses were “stark”); PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
NEW JERSEY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 
(1999), http://222.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (finding that searches of cars on the New Jersey Turnpike were 
even more racially disparate than the initial stops:  77.2% of all “consent” searches were of minorities and 
blacks); CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICES:  A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 88-89 (1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stp_frsk.pdf 
(finding that African-American pedestrians in New York City were stopped six times more frequently than 
Whites, and that stops of African-Americans were less likely to result in arrests than stops of Whites); STEPHEN 
M. HAAS ET AL., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., WEST VIRGINIA 
TRAFFIC STOP STUDY FINAL REPORT 1 (2009), 
www.djcs.wv.gov/SACDocuments/WVAC_Traffic_NEWOverviewofStatewideFindings 2009.pdf  (“State-level 
results indicate that black drivers are 1.64 times more likely . . . [and] Hispanics were 1.48 times more likely to 
be stopped compared to white drivers.”); AMY FARRELL ET AL., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE ON RACE & 
JUSTICE, RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS ACT FINAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2003), 
www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/IRJ_docs/RIFinalReport.pdf (“In most communities in Rhode Island non-
white drivers are stopped disproportionately to their presence in the driving population.”); ALEXANDER WEISS & 
DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN LAW & JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT 2010 ANNUAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (2011), 
www.dot.il.gov/travelstats/2010_20ITSS_20 Executive_Summary.pdf  (“[V]ehicles driven by African Americans 
and Hispanics are twice as likely to be the subject of consent search than[n] those driven by Caucasians”); 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZONA, DRIVING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN: AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL 
PROFILING IN ARIZONA 3 (2008), www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DrivingWhileBlackorBrown.pdf 
(finding that Native Americans were 3.25 times more likely, and African Americans and Hispanics 2.5 times 
more likely to be subjected to searches than whites); Md. State Conference  of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of 
State Police, 72 F.Supp.2d 560 (D. Md. 1999); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F.Supp.2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 
2000).  In the most recent study, Dr. John Lamberth found racial disparities in traffic stops in Kalamazoo, 
Michigan, in a sophisticated study that accounted for non-racial factors.  JOHN LAMBERTH, FINAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFIC STOPS FOR KALAMAZOO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (2013).  Traffic stops present some issues 
different from pedestrian stops flowing primarily from the fact that almost all drivers violate traffic laws at the 
same rate, thus permitting even pretextual stops, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
 
 
As a legal matter, litigation over racial disparities in police searches is controlled by 
equal protection principles, and in particular the standard of disparate treatment or 
intentional discrimination based on race or ethnicity.12  In the equal protection analysis, two 
key considerations emerge: the extent to which observed disparities are likely to reflect bias 
rather than other factors, and the extent to which stop and search practices further the 
governmental interest in protecting public safety.  To examine the question of bias, experts 
often subject available data on stop, search, and seizure patterns to statistical analysis 
designed to determine whether non-racial factors such as crime rates, police deployment 
patterns, or social influences can explain racial disparities. Such analyses often involve the 
calculation of “hit-rates”, or the fraction of stops or searches where police actually seize 
weapons or contraband, effectuate an arrest, or issue a summons. Appropriate statistical 
analysis of search behavior must confront a number of technical issues, including 
identification of the most appropriate statistical benchmarks and non-racial factors.   
Critics of stop and frisk also argue that this practice is of limited utility in protecting 
public safety. The “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated established by the Court in 
Terry requires significantly less proof of wrongdoing than the more rigorous probable cause 
standard traditionally required for searches.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the hit-rates 
for traffic stops and stops and frisks are generally substantially lower than for arrests or 
searches conducted on full probable cause.13  Indeed, where police have engaged in random 
stops without any particularized suspicion, for example at highway checkpoints, the hit-rates 
have in some cases been higher than hit-rates for stops and frisks where police assert 
observations of objectively suspicious conduct.14            
Appendix A provides a more detailed description of three recent examples—in Los 
Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia--where courts have turned to data to better understand 
patterns of racial disparity in stops.  These examples illustrate ways in which experts use 
available data to assess police compliance with the stop and frisk “reasonable suspicion” 
doctrine and to examine the effectiveness of this practice by analyzing hit-rates. 
Comparison of the experiences of Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia reveal a 
number of important lessons.  In all three cities, available data demonstrated a striking 
disparity in the likelihood of being stopped and searched among African-Americans.  
Additional analysis revealed that in some cases these disparities could be explained by non-
racial factors such as underlying crime rates, but in many cases the disparities could not be 
attributed to readily measurable external factors. In New York, the data were viewed as 
sufficiently problematic that, in highly contested civil rights lawsuit, Floyd v. City of New 
York,15 the courts found that the City had a municipal policy and practice that violated both 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (official policy of segregating prisoners by race); 
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000). 
13 See infra, 
14 City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (drug checkpoint yielded drug seizures in 7.4% of 
stops). See also Bernard Harcourt & Tracy E. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 809 (2011).  
15 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 
 
the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibition on racial discrimination.  
New York’s experience since Floyd also suggests that, in the event that stop and frisk 
procedures are viewed as sufficiently problematic so as to prompt new policies, it may be 
feasible to substantially reduce the scope of stop and frisks without a significant adverse 
effect on crime rates.  In New York City, the number of stops dropped from a high of close to 
700,000 per year (2011) to approximately 50,000 per year by the City’s latest calculations, 
with little change in the historically low murder and violent crime rate.  It is also significant 
that other cities, including Newark, Boston and Chicago are now recording all stops and 
frisks and have established protocols for analysis on the relevant Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment benchmarks.   
 
Avenues of Reform 
 
1. Collect comprehensive data on discretionary stops, searches, and seizures by 
police and make these data available for expert analysis.   
 
Neither the scope of police stop practices in Delaware nor how those practices affect 
arrest rates, crime patterns, or racial fairness are fully understood by the courts, police, or 
the public. Because such practices are a central part of policing yet have raised significant 
questions concerning their effectiveness, compliance with Fourth Amendment standards, and 
their racial distribution in other jurisdictions, Delaware would benefit from better data that 
might advance this type of study for the state.  Whatever one’s views on the effectiveness and 
legality of current practices, it is impossible to fairly assess any police department’s conduct 
in this area without reliable data.    
Delaware is in the position of being a beneficiary of the studies and litigation 
regarding police practices in other locations. Other jurisdictions have developed stop and 
frisk forms, electronic data bases, protocols for review and analysis, and guidelines on 
relevant benchmarks for evaluation and enforcement.  Given the broad reliance on stop and 
frisk and car stops as proactive police measures and ongoing concerns about inequality and 
racial discrimination in policing and effectiveness of law enforcement, a decision to engage in 
a process of collection and analysis of stop data would provide significant information and 
benefits.  
 
 
II. Bail and Pretrial Detention 
 
Soon after police arrest a suspect, the government must decide what charges, if any, 
to file and whether to release the suspect from custody and if so on what terms.  For minor 
crimes, this may be resolved at the police station through “station-house bail,” in which a 
suspect is quickly released upon signing a promise to appear at later proceedings or paying 
 
 
a modest amount of money bail that will be forfeited if he later fails to appear.16  Otherwise, 
bail is set when a suspect is brought before a judge or magistrate shortly after arrest.17 
 
Contribution to Racial Disparities and Inaccuracies in Criminal Justice 
 
Approximately twelve million people are jailed in the United States every year.18  On 
any given day, there are approximately three-quarters of a million people in jail, sixty percent 
of them awaiting trial.19  The U.S. detains more people pretrial than any other nation, and 
detains people pretrial at a rate three times the world average.20  The prevalence of this 
practice creates profound race and class disparities in the criminal justice system and distorts 
the integrity of criminal proceedings. 
Money bail, by definition, favors those who have money.  The Constitution prohibits 
the detention of a person solely because of his poverty, but in the pretrial realm this 
prohibition has been largely a dead letter.21  An estimated 90% percent of U.S. pretrial 
detainees are held simply for inability to post bail.22  Because of disparate poverty rates, 
members of minority groups are more likely to be face this plight.23 
The nature of bail hearings also puts poor arrestees at a disadvantage.  The two key 
questions at the hearing are whether an arrestee poses a risk of flight or a danger to the 
community, and a judge must answer them quickly, based on minimal information.  Judges 
generally extrapolate from the police officer’s arrest report, the arrestee’s rap sheet, and the 
arrestee’s own report of his residence, employment, education, family circumstances, and the 
like.  Arrestees who are inarticulate or speak limited English have trouble presenting this 
information.  These data, furthermore, correlate with socioeconomic status and race.  
Arrestees with less education, unsteady employment, uncertain immigration status, non-
marital family units, or prior exposure to the criminal justice system are more likely to be 
                                                          
16 See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 115 (2014), 
static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf.  
17 This must occur within forty-eight hours of arrest.  Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 
(1991). 
18 RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAIL 
IN AMERICA 4 (2015), www.vera.org/pubs/special/incarcerations-front-door-misuse-jails-america. 
19 TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, 1-4 (2015). 
20 SCHNACKE, supra note 166, at 22. 
21 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); Williams v. 
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Statement of Interest filed in Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (M.D. Al., Feb. 13, 2015). 
22 SCHNACKE, supra note 166, at 24.  
23 See, e.g., CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 12-13 (2014); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END 
THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 15-17 (2012); Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, There’s Blatant Inequality at 
Nearly Every Phase of the Criminal Justice System, BUSINESS INSIDER, Aug. 9, 2015, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-blatant-inequality-at-nearly-every-phase-of-the-criminal-justice-system-
2015-8 (summarizing social science research showing, inter alia, that black arrestees are detained pretrial at 
higher rates that whites); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 13 (2d ed. 2008), 
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.pdf. 
 
 
deemed high risk—and are disproportionately likely to be members of minority groups.24  
Finally, implicit bias can influence pretrial release decisions.  Recent research has found that, 
even controlling for other factors, black and Latino defendants were more likely to be 
detained than white defendants.25 
The disproportionate pretrial detention of poor, minority, immigrant and limited-
English speaking populations is a serious problem in itself.  Pretrial detention disrupts lives 
and communities.  Arrestees are prone to attempt or commit suicide, especially in the first 
days after arrest.26  They may suffer sexual assault or physical abuse in jail.  Pretrial 
detention of more than a few days may cost an arrestee his job; detention of more than a few 
weeks may cost him his apartment; detention lasting months may cost him his house and 
eventually his family.27   
Disproportionate rates of pretrial detention also create downstream disparities in 
criminal proceedings, because pretrial detention distorts the proceedings that follow.  A 
detained arrestee cannot effectively locate witnesses, communicate with his lawyer, and 
develop a defense.  As a result, people who are detained pre-trial are more likely to be 
convicted and receive a sentence of imprisonment than similarly situated people who are not 
detained.28  Many people, moreover, never make it to trial.  Detained people regularly face 
the choice of fighting their case from jail or accepting a guilty plea and release, with a 
sentence of probation or time served.  With jobs, homes and children on the line, most people 
will choose the latter, regardless of the strength or propriety of the case against them.  Even 
for wholly innocent people, it is sometimes the only possible choice.29 
 
 
                                                          
24 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2013), 
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf; U.S. 
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, CENSUS.GOV 151 tbl. 230 (“Educational 
Attainment by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: 1970-2010”), www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/educ.pdf; 
Lindsey Cook, U.S. Education: Still Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/01/28/us-education-still-separate-and-unequal; Diana B. 
Elliott et al., Historical Marriage Trends from 1890-2010: A Focus on Race Differences, Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, CA (May 3-5, 2012); BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY tbl. E-16 (“Unemployment rates by 
age, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity”), www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm; JEFFREY S. PASSEL & 
D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009).  
25 See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 
COUNTY – TECHNICAL REPORT (2014), www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ nij/grants/247227.pdf. 
26 See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND 
LOCAL JAILS 1-7 (2005). 
27 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 23, at 3. 
28 See CHRISTOPHER LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND, & ALEXANDER M. HOLSINGER, THE LAURA AND JOHN 
ARNOLD FOUNDATION, INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES (2013); 
MARY T. PHILLIPS, NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 
115-17 (2012).  These findings are consistent with older research.  See, e.g., Stevens H. Clarke & Susan T. 
Kurtz, The Importance of Interim Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476 
(1983); Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031, 1048–49 (1954); Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641 (1964). 
29 See PHILLIPS, supra note 28; NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE 
9 n.1 (3d ed. 2004). 
 
 
Avenues of Reform 
 
As awareness of these problems has grown, state and local governments have begun 
to consider pretrial reform.  The overarching goal is to eliminate unnecessary detention and 
reduce reliance on money bail. To accomplish this without compromising public safety, reform 
efforts can look to two basic principles.  First:  In considering conditions of pretrial release, 
courts should use the least restrictive means necessary to assure the accused’s appearance at 
future court dates and protect the community from harm.30  As discussed below, studies to 
date suggest that the vast majority of arrestees can and should be released pending trial.  
Pre-trial detention should be a last resort.  Second:  Release conditions should be tailored to 
their goal.31  Money bail, for example, is a mechanism to ensure appearance, and it is neither 
appropriate nor effective as a tool to address public safety risks (other conditions of release 
are available for that purpose).32  Jurisdictions can pursue both legal and policy reforms to 
implement these principles. 
 
1. Reduce arrests and prosecutions by substituting tickets and diversion.   
 
Bail reform can begin with policing and prosecution.  A number of jurisdictions have 
sought to reduce the number of people who arrive at a bail hearing in the first place by 
authorizing police to issue summonses or tickets, rather than arresting, for a broader swath 
of minor public-order offenses.33  Among those who are arrested, people charged with low-
level offenses can be channeled directly into diversion or deferred prosecution programs.34   
 
2. After arrest, make release on recognizance pending trial the default, and 
ensure appearance through reminder systems.   
 
                                                          
30 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 10-1.1 & 10-1.2 (3d ed. Am. Bar. Ass’n 2007) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
31 See ABA STANDARDS 10-1.2. 
32 See ABA STANDARDS 10-1.4(d) (“Financial conditions should not be employed to respond to concerns for 
public safety.”). 
33 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS 10-1.3 (“Use of citations and summonses”); Standards 10-2.1–10.3.3 
(encouraging jurisdictions to employ citations and summons broadly in lieu of arrest for minor offenses, and 
providing specific guidelines); Chris Goldstein, Marijuana Arrests Down 73 Percent, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/philly420/Philly_marijuana_arrests_down_73_percent.html  (describing 
initiative encouraging citation rather than arrest for marijuana possession); Bruce Eggler, New Orleans City 
Council Reclassifies Pot Possession, Prostitution to Reduce Criminal Dockets, NOLA.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/12/new_orleans_city_council_recla.html; Mary T. Phillips, Desk 
Appearance Tickets:  Their Past, Present and Possible Future (New York Crim. Just. Agency Research Brief No. 
34, May 2014), www.nycja.org/library.php. 
34 Kentucky, for instance, operates both a pretrial diversion and a deferred prosecution program.  See 
PRETRIAL SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, KENTUCKY COURTS OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL REFORM IN 
KENTUCKY 5-8 (2013). 
 
 
Because very few people willfully abscond or present a specific threat, all bail 
determinations should begin from a presumption of release.35  Federal law and several state 
codes have implemented that presumption by requiring courts to release arrestees on 
recognizance or with an unsecured bond absent an affirmative finding that the person 
presents a specific risk.36  A high rate of release on recognizance need not mean high rates of 
nonappearance.  A recent study suggests, in fact, that immediate release may decrease the 
risk of both nonappearance and future criminal activity, because it minimizes the 
destabilization of people’s lives.37  Kentucky’s experience is illuminating.  In 2011, Kentucky 
passed legislation that requires a court to release low-risk arrestees without bail unless it 
finds that the person is a flight risk or danger to others.38  In the year after its 
implementation, non-financial release rates rose from 51% to 66%, with no increase in 
nonappearance or rearrests (in fact, appearance rates increased slightly and rearrests fell).39   
For released defendants, appearance rates can be improved through simple reminder 
systems, like robocalls, robotexts, emails, and mailings that can be used as excuses from 
school and work.  Counties that have implemented automated reminder systems have 
reported 37-38% decreases in failure-to-appear rates.40  In Jefferson County, Colorado, a pilot 
study documented an appearance rate of 92% among people on pretrial release who were 
successfully contacted by phone.41  Jefferson County has now created a permanent Court 
Date Notification Program, and other jurisdictions are adopting the model.42  Speeding up 
cases so that arrestees need not accrue too many absences from work, school, and parenting 
may also reduce rates of nonappearance. 
 
3. If an arrestee presents a substantial risk, impose the least restrictive 
conditions necessary to mitigate it.   
 
                                                          
35 See ABA STANDARDS 10-5.1 9 (“It should be presumed that defendants are entitled to release on personal 
recognizance on condition that they attend all required court proceedings and they do not commit any criminal 
offense.”). 
36 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); Iowa Code Ann. § 811.2; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.520; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 15A-534(b)-(c); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-10.  The Delaware Code instructs courts to release arrestees on 
recognizance or with an unsecured bond “whenever feasible,” but implicitly lays the burden on the accused 
person to satisfy the court that she or he presents no risk of flight or danger, rather than requiring the 
prosecutor to show that she or he does present a specific risk.  See 11 Del. Code §§ 2101 (2015). 
37 See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
PRETRIAL DETENTION (2013). 
38 See Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011); 
TARA BOH KLUTE & MARK HEYERLY, PRETRIAL SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT ON 
IMPACT OF HOUSE BILL 463: OUTCOMES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2012); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra 
note 18, at 33. 
39 See Klute & Heyerly, supra note 38, at 4–10; MARK HEYERLY, PRETRIAL SERVICES, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS, KENTUCKY COURTS OF JUSTICE 13–16 (2013); IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2011 
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PRETRIAL JUSTICE: THE 2014 PROGRESS REPORT 9 (Pretrial Justice Institute 2015). 
40 Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court-Appearance Rates 
and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date Reminders: The Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Pilot 
Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV. 86, 88 (2012).       
41 Id.  Among those for whom a message was left on voicemail or with a responsible adult, the appearance 
rate was 88%.  The baseline appearance rate among the target population prior to the study was 79%.  Id.  
42 Id. 
 
 
Some arrestees may pose a serious risk of nonappearance or danger, and for this group 
further conditions on release may be appropriate.  In order to assess arrestees’ risk level, 
jurisdictions are increasingly deploying professional pretrial services agencies and rigorous 
risk assessment screening tools.43  While most risk assessment instruments include “static” 
demographic factors that correlate with race and class,44 a new instrument called the Public 
Safety Assessment–Court uses no demographic factors and has shown promising results:  
pilot projects resulted in higher pretrial release rates, lower jail populations, and no increase 
in crime.45  Twenty-one jurisdictions across the country are slated to adopt the PSA-Court in 
the near future.46  
With a rigorous risk assessment regime in place, courts can identify high-risk 
arrestees and impose the least restrictive measure that will address the risk.  There are many 
alternatives short of detention.47  For arrestees at high risk of nonappearance, property bonds 
or personal sureties can be effective: few arrestees will flee if their parents’ home is on the 
line.  Pre-trial supervision, which can include drug testing and electronic monitoring as well 
as assistance in pursuing social services, also facilitates appearance.  If cash bail is necessary, 
it should be the minimum amount that will “reasonably” assure the accused’s appearance in 
court, given his or her resources, and should be as easy to post as possible (credit-card kiosks 
and online payment systems can streamline the process).48  For arrestees who pose a serious 
threat to the public, courts can impose conditions like electronic or GPS monitoring that 
restrict movement and discourage crime.49  If the threat arises from an arrestee’s substance 
abuse or mental illness, courts can require periodic drug testing or outpatient mental-health 
treatment.50 
Many jurisdictions are working to put these principles into practice.  The District of 
Columbia has long sought to minimize reliance on money bail, and benefits from an 
experienced Pretrial Services Agency.  The District releases approximately 80% of arrestees 
                                                          
43 Besides conducting risk assessments, pretrial services agencies can verify arrestees’ personal information 
to inform the pretrial release decision, operate a court-date notification program, and supervise moderate- or 
high-risk people who have been released pretrial.   
44 See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 231 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014). 
45 The PSA–Court uses only factors related to criminal history, current charge, and current age.  This does 
not eliminate its potentially disparate racial impact, but does make it less concerning than others.  See Press 
Release, Laura & John Arnold Foundation, More Than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to Help 
Judges Decide Which Defendants to Detain Prior to Trial (June 26, 2015); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing 
Conjecture With Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-
the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html?_r=0; LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION, RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX 
MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT-COURT IN KENTUCKY (2014) [hereinafter LJAF, PSA RESULTS]. 
46 See sources cited supra. 
47 See ABA STANDARDS 10-1.4, 10-5.2. 
48  “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ 
under the Eighth Amendment.”  Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).   
49 See ABA STANDARDS 10-5.2; Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 
YALE L.J. 1344, 1348 (2014). 
50 Financial conditions are not an appropriate means of addressing a public safety risk, and pre-trial 
detention for dangerousness is not warranted unless the state, in an adversary hearing, demonstrates by clear 
and convincing evidence that “no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any 
person.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
 
 
without bail, yet rates of nonappearance and rearrest are lower than national averages.51  In 
Kentucky, courts now assess arrestees’ risk level with the PSA-Court.  Low-risk arrestees 
are released without bail or supervision.52  Moderate- and high-risk arrestees may be referred 
for “Monitored Conditional Release” (MCR), a supervision program that tailors a risk 
reduction strategy to the arrestee’s needs and the specific risk he presents.  In the first six 
months that Kentucky deployed the PSA-Court, it released more people pending trial, but 
crime by released defendants fell by 15%, and appearance rates remained extremely high.53  
New Orleans, New Jersey and New York City are also undertaking reforms to reduce pretrial 
detention.54   
In order to ensure that money bail does not result in detention and is never imposed 
to address a public safety risk, courts should have the authority to detain the narrow category 
of arrestees who do pose an acute danger pursuant to transparent and fair procedures.55  The 
proposed constitutional amendment before the Delaware legislature would provide detention 
authority—but does not articulate its limits.  That raises the concern that future legislatures 
may authorize pretrial detention of increasing scope.  To ensure that pre-trial release 
remains the norm and pre-trial detention “the carefully limited exception,” any constitutional 
grant of power to preventively detain should specify that no person may be detained unless 
the state shows, by clear and convincing evidence in an adversarial proceeding, that the 
person poses such a severe threat of danger that no condition or conditions of release suffice 
to mitigate the risk.56     
                                                          
51 In 2008, 12% of released defendants missed a court appearance and 12% were rearrested before trial.  In 
2012, 11% of released defendants were rearrested and 11% missed a court date.  Nationally, 16% of released 
defendants were rearrested and 17% missed a court date.  See Performance Measures, PRETRIAL SERVICES 
AGENCY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, www.psa.gov/?q=data/performance_measures; ARTHUR W. PEPIN, 
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER: EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/evidencebased_pretrialrelease.aut
hcheckdam.pdf (last accessed Sept. 29, 2015); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 33. 
52 Unless the court overrides the low-risk designation with an affirmative finding of risk.  See LJAF, PSA 
RESULTS, supra note 45. 
53 LJAF, PSA RESULTS, supra note 45. 
54 In 2012, New Orleans launched a pilot project with the Vera Institution of Justice that includes 
comprehensive pretrial services and a court-date reminder system.  (The city also built a smaller jail, and the 
police department shifted toward issuing summonses for low-level nonviolent offenses.)  See The Ed. Bd., The 
New Orleans Jails, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/opinion/the-
new-orleans-jails-10-years-later.html?_r=0; Tara Boh Klute & Lori Eville, An Assessment of the New Orleans 
Pretrial Services Program (Nat’l Inst. Corrections Technical Assistance Paper No. 13C1066, 2014).  In 2014, 
New Jersey passed a law that ties pretrial release decisions to risk rather than resources, encourages 
individualized release conditions, and creates a pretrial services agency.  See Margaret Talbot, The Case Against 
Cash Bail, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-case-against-cash-
bail; Matt Arco, Christie Signs Bail Reform Measure, Lauds Lawmakers for Bipartisanship, NJ.COM (Aug. 11, 
2014), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/08/christie_signs_bail_reform_measure_lauds_lawmakers_for_bipartis
anship.html.  In 2015, New York City announced a plan to release thousands of low-risk defendants by 
substituting pretrial supervision for money bail.  See Rick Rojas, New York City to Relax Bail Requirements for 
Low-Level Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nyregion/new-york-city-
introduces-bail-reform-plan-for-low-level-offenders.html. 
55 See SCHNACKE, supra note 166, at 44–45. 
56 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (asserting that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, 
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception”); see also id. at 750–52 (upholding 
provisions of federal Bail Reform Act that provide for pretrial detention on basis that they are narrowly focused 
 
 
 
4. Improve process:  Ensure access to counsel in pretrial release hearings, and 
accelerate proceedings for detained persons. 
 
Only a small percentage of defendants should be detained pending trial because they 
pose an ineradicable danger to the community or risk of flight.  For these, managing court 
dockets more aggressively to speed up their cases, and capping pretrial detention at three or 
six months, would lower the costs of pretrial detention and the overwhelming pressures to 
plead guilty.  
Finally, providing counsel to arrestees beginning at the bail hearing helps to reduce 
unnecessary detention and improve the accuracy of criminal proceedings.57  It may prevent 
innocent people from pleading guilty simply to get out of jail by increasing the chance of 
release and decreasing the chance of an ill-advised plea.  It reduces the risk of wrongful 
conviction at trial by allowing defense counsel to investigate the facts of the case and preserve 
evidence in a timely way.  It enables early but informed plea-bargaining, which benefits all 
actors in the system.  And it ensures future appearance by creating a line of communication 
between the accused and his counsel.   
 
 
III. Charging, Plea Bargaining, and Sentencing 
 
Once an arrest has been made, prosecutors decide what formal charges, if any, to file.  
Plea-bargaining follows.  The process varies dramatically from county to county and state to 
state, but at core it entails the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to a specified charge or 
charges in exchange for a sentence that is less than what he can expect to receive if convicted 
at trial.  Sentences are imposed by judges.  Depending on the jurisdiction, judges may be 
constrained by the terms of the plea bargain or the substantive law, or they may have broad 
discretion to impose the sentence they think best. 
 
Contribution to Racial Disparities and Inaccuracies in Criminal Justice 
 
One might think that prosecutors would charge on the basis of the crime(s) committed, 
that innocent people would not plead guilty, and that sentences would approximately reflect 
the blameworthiness of the person convicted.  None of these things is necessarily true.  
Factors other than culpability often drive charging, plea-bargaining and sentencing, to the 
                                                          
and guarantee extensive procedural protections to accused).  New Jersey amended its constitution in 2014 to 
authorize pretrial detention, but did not specify limitations on that power.  See N.J. CONST. art. 1 § 11.  
57 See SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER AND PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNSEL: THE 
LAW, IMPLEMENTATION AND BENEFITS (2014), sixthamendment.org/6ac/6ACPJI_ earlyappointmentofcounsel_ 
032014.pdf; see also, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case 
for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002); Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and 
the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513 (2013). 
 
 
disadvantage of poor and minority defendants, and with the result that criminal conviction 
may have little to do with guilt. 
A range of factors unrelated to the crime(s) committed often animate charging 
decisions.  Prosecutors consider the defendant’s rap sheet, substance abuse history, and the 
office’s enforcement priorities and resource constraints.  Defendants who are considered 
better risks—that is, those who come from intact families and good neighborhoods, who are 
well educated, who do not have an extensive criminal record, and who have stable personal 
and professional lives—are more likely to have charges declined, dropped, reduced, or 
diverted for drug treatment, mental-health treatment, restitution, or the like.58  As with bail, 
these factors correlate with socioeconomic status and race.  Some, like prior convictions, may 
be appropriate considerations nonetheless, but others may not.  Prior arrests that did not 
result in conviction, for instance, may have low predictive value and flow from racially 
disparate arrest practices, such as those documented in New York City.59   
Another charging practice that distorts the accuracy of criminal process and may 
contribute to racial disparities is “overcharging,” in which prosecutors file more charges or 
more severe charges than the case warrants with the goal of inducing a plea or the 
defendant’s cooperation through charge-bargaining.60  Overcharging pressures defendants to 
accept plea bargains that may not reflect their actual conduct or culpability. It exerts most 
pressure on those with least leverage in the bargaining process (i.e. those with criminal 
records and few resources), who are disproportionately likely to belong to minority groups. 
Charging disparities and distortions play out in plea bargaining.  An additional 
wrinkle is that, by the time of plea bargaining, defendants have defense counsel, who vary 
widely in their funding, ability, and expertise.  The variation affects outcomes.  Defendants 
who can afford to pay experienced private counsel can investigate more and credibly threaten 
to put up a fight, instead of meekly accepting whatever deal is on offer.  They are more likely 
to strike cooperation deals, earning discounts if they provide useful information against other 
defendants.  Defendants with unskilled or overworked counsel are at a disadvantage, as are 
those who speak limited English; the need for interpreters impedes communication.61 
The incentives of prosecutors and defense counsel can also distort the process.  To the 
extent that prosecutors are rewarded for convictions and defense counsel benefit from 
resolving cases quickly, both sides have strong incentives to prioritize a quick conviction over 
                                                          
58 Cf. Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhoefer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and 
Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 SO. CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992) (finding that 
AUSAs sought to craft lower sentences for defendants they viewed as “salvageable”).  
59 See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES (2013) (finding that only about half of arrests made subsequent to a stop-
and-frisk resulted in conviction).  
60 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968) 
(describing this practice); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 879 (2009) (describing incentives to overcharge and effect on plea-
bargaining). 
61 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468 (2004) 
(observing that “plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, education, intelligence, 
and confidence.”). 
 
 
a disposition that reflects culpability.62  That causes distortions in both directions:  it 
sometimes leads to bargains that are unduly lenient, which prosecutors may prefer to the 
uncertainty of trial, but in other cases produces negotiated sentences that are excessive, when 
prosecutors insist on a guilty plea in the face of weak evidence and defense counsel has little 
incentive to fight.63  The effect is corrosive.  As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have written, 
“[t]he public in general, and victims in particular, lose faith in a system where the primary 
goal is processing and the secondary goal is justice.”64  
The substantive law, finally, can render plea bargaining coercive and exacerbate 
racial disparities in the system.  Where prosecutors can credibly threaten that defendants 
will receive a sentence that is many years or decades longer than the plea offer if convicted 
at trial, most defendants will plead.  Innocent people will and do plead guilty.65  Habitual 
offender laws and mandatory minimums, in particular, enable this dynamic.  Aside from 
distorting the accuracy of convictions, habitual offender laws have a disparate impact on 
black men, who are disproportionately likely to have prior convictions.66  
The sentencing process itself adds another layer of distortion.  Criminal histories often 
drive sentences.  As a result, recidivists may receive greatly enhanced sentences, even if prior 
convictions were for relatively minor, non-dangerous crimes.  Other perceived indicators of 
risk have a similar effect.  Prosecutors may insist on, and judges may impose, a higher 
sentences for defendants who lack stable employment or an intact community—factors that 
also correlate with race and socioeconomic status.67  Finally, privileged, non-minority 
defendants may benefit from prosecutors’ and judges’ implicit biases, particularly if they 
remind judges and lawyers of themselves.  Even controlling for variables like criminal 
history, recent studies have found measurable racial disparity in criminal sentencing.68 
 
                                                          
62 Id. at 2470–82; Barkow, supra note 60, at 881–82. 
63 Id. at 2472. 
64 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002). 
65 See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,  N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/; cf. John H. Blume & 
Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
157, 191 (2014); Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An Innovative 
Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 48 (2013) (“As is 
now evident from the study described herein, the Supreme Court was wrong to place such confidence in the 
ability of individuals to assert their right to trial in the face of grave choices.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 (2008) (noting that nine of first two hundred people exonerated by 
Innocence Project had pled guilty); John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Innocent, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Dec. 26, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-the-innocent; D. Michael 
Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778-79 (2007). 
66 Reliable statistics about the number of Americans with past convictions are surprisingly hard to come by, 
but current and recent rates of imprisonment are much higher among black Americans than white.  See E. ANN 
CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013 tbl. 8 (2014) (recording imprisonment rate of 2,805 
per 100,000 black Americans and 144 per 100,000 white Americans); TUSHAR KANSAL & MARC MAUER, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 12 (2005). 
67 See sources cited supra note 27. 
68 See, e.g., KANSAL & MAUER, supra note 66; David Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Sonja B. Starr & M. M. Rehavi, 
Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 6 J. POL. ECON. 122 (2014). 
 
 
 
Avenues for Reform 
 
To mitigate racial disparities and inaccuracies is this arena, jurisdictions can pursue 
reforms designed to ensure that culpability, rather than demographic status, is the 
touchstone of charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing.  With extremely limited exceptions, 
charges filed, offers extended through plea-bargaining, and final sentences should always 
reflect, and never be disproportionate to, the defendant’s culpable conduct.  This is no easy 
goal to attain, but there are clear avenues for policy and legal reform.  
 
1. Change prosecutors’ incentives in plea-bargaining. 
 
Legislatures can change prosecutors’ incentives by ensuring that they are not 
evaluated and rewarded according to absolute conviction numbers, but rather according to 
measures that reflect a healthy and effective system of criminal justice.  Prosecutors should 
be praised and rewarded, for example, for high “as-charged conviction” rates (the rate at 
which they convict on the initial charge filed), low custodial and probation populations, low 
crime and recidivism rates, and high ratings for fairness and skill by peers, defense lawyers, 
judges, victims, and defendants.69  A legislature could require prosecutors’ offices to collect 
and publicize these data, so that the public can assess their performance accordingly. 
Chief prosecutors themselves are best situated to implement these performance 
criteria.  In addition, separating charging decisions from the prosecution of a case can reduce 
the incentive to overcharge.70  For example, Harry Connick Sr., when he led the New Orleans 
District Attorney’s Office, created a separate charging division staffed with experienced 
attorneys to ensure consistency and accuracy in charging.71  Alternately, Rachel Barkow has 
proposed that prosecutors’ offices should separate their “investigative” and “adjudicative” 
functions to prevent bias from infecting charging and bargaining decisions.72 
 
2. Ensure effective representation for indigent defendants. 
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 Perhaps the single most important thing a jurisdiction can do to reduce class-based 
disparity and inaccuracies in plea-bargaining is to adequately fund an independent public 
defender’s office that employs qualified, well trained, full-time, salaried lawyers.  As 
documented by Paul Heaton and James M. Anderson in a Philadelphia case study, these 
institutional conditions minimize perverse incentives and enable effective representation, 
producing better outcomes for poor defendants.73      
 
3. Make charging and plea-bargaining transparent and accountable. 
 
A central part of the problem with charging and plea-bargaining processes is that they 
are opaque.  Bringing them out into the open would allow for better public scrutiny and more 
informed debate, which can protect against disparate and inaccurate results. 74 
To begin with, legislatures could require or encourage prosecutors’ offices to develop 
internal policies for charging and plea-bargaining, commit them to writing, and make them 
public.75  Such policies, subject to public scrutiny, can further fairness and equality in 
prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining practices.76 
Making the plea-bargaining process itself more public and transparent would help 
tether plea bargains to culpability.  One simple reform option is to require that all plea offers 
be placed on the record.  If the prosecution is willing to accept a one-year plea early in the 
process, it strains credulity to later demand twenty years as essential to public safety.  Some 
post-trial sentencing differential is warranted to reflect the cost of trial and the foregone risk 
of acquittal, but judges at sentencing could consider what sentence the prosecution initially 
deemed appropriate as a benchmark for their post-trial sentences.  Doing so would shrink 
the gap between pleas and trials, reducing their coercive effect and thus the dangers posed 
to innocent and minority defendants. 
 Judges could also improve plea-bargaining by exercising more oversight.  They need 
not passively await the parties’ deal; as New York federal judge Jed Rakoff recommends, 
judges could actively participate in the process, making nonbinding recommendations as to 
the appropriate bargain.  This level of neutral oversight could protect innocent defendants 
against pressures to plead guilty, create better records, and better inform defendants’ choices, 
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as long as each defendants remained free to reject the recommendation and have his case 
tried before a different judge.77 
Delaware could also take a page from the military justice system.  Military judges 
take great care in reviewing the factual bases for guilty pleas, offering little deference to the 
parties’ bargains, and applying stringent appellate review of what the military calls 
improvident pleas.  That would make pleas more accurate, insure better information, and 
provide a check upon sloppy investigation and poor lawyering. 
Ultimately, though, it is the substantive law that makes plea-bargaining coercive. If 
sentence exposure at trial is excessive and prosecutors offer a dramatic plea discount, 
innocent but rational people will plead guilty.  Reform of the plea-bargaining process must 
go hand in hand with reform of the substantive law. 
 
4. Tether sentences to culpability.  
 
A number of states have undertaken sentencing reform in the last few years, and more 
is on the horizon.  At least ten states, including Delaware, have repealed or narrowed 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws.78  At least six states have narrowed habitual offender 
enhancements.79  At least eleven states have reclassified or redefined drug offenses to reduce 
penalties for certain conduct.80  The voters of California, the state with perhaps the harshest 
three-strikes law on the books, passed Proposition 36 in 2012 to modify the law, such that 
only serious, violent third-strike crimes now trigger life sentences.81  Delaware should join 
this trend and modify its own habitual offender law to ensure that non-violent offenses do 
not trigger mandatory life imprisonment.82 
Finally, Delaware needs to assess fines carefully in each case to ensure that jails do 
not turn into debtors’ prison.  No one should remain imprisoned simply because he is poor, 
but in many counties and states this is a common event.83  The Missouri Supreme Court, for 
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example, recently changed its rules to require judges to assess defendants’ ability to pay fines; 
if they cannot, courts must either put them on appropriate payment plans or reduce or waive 
the fine.84 
 
 
IV. Alternatives to Incarceration 
 
For some individuals, criminal behavior is a symptom of an underlying issue, like drug 
addiction or mental illness, which is not well addressed by incarceration or fines. In such 
cases, an alternative to incarceration (ATI) may potentially generate a larger reduction in 
future crime at lower cost to society than conventional punishment.  Two of the most common 
ATI strategies currently in use in western countries are essentially specialized types of court 
systems: drug courts, for people with underlying substance abuse problems, and veteran’s 
courts, which handle crimes committed by current or former members of the US armed forces.  
A third ATI, commonly referred to as “restorative justice”, is an approach to punishment 
which focuses on the victim and perpetrator coming to a mutually agreed upon resolution. 
To date, there have been only a handful of large scale, high quality, evaluations of 
modern ATI programs.  Existing scholarly research does suggest factors that affect whether 
or not an ATI program is able to reduce recidivism and be politically feasible to implement.  
First, a successful ATI program must provide a treatment whose efficacy is based on sound 
scientific principles—there has to be evidence that the intervention can work.  Second, the 
eligibility requirements for ATI should be based on characteristics that are easily observable 
to court officials—there must a reliable method to identify which individuals should receive 
the treatment.  Third, in order to be politically feasible, the program must be able to 
continually demonstrate that it is providing the public some benefit and not contributing to 
racial or socioeconomic disparities in the criminal justice system or society at large.  This last 
point is critical; while currently politically unpopular, the rise of sentencing guidelines in the 
1970s and 1980s was in part a response to concerns about racial and socioeconomic 
disparities in the punishments chosen by judges, who had almost complete discretion about 
sentences. 
  
A. Drug Courts 
Drug addiction is widely regarded as a form of disease in the medical community, in 
part because drug addiction has clearly defined and quantifiable physical markers and is 
amenable to resolution through medical intervention.85 At the same time, reflective of 
popular views in the U.S. regarding the role of choice and agency in drug use, criminal codes 
have designated possession of many addictive substances as a criminal offense.  Rather than 
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process people charged with lower-level drug offenses through the traditional criminal justice 
system, individuals transferred to drug courts have their cases adjudicated by specially 
trained judges who are authorized to require individuals to undergo medical treatment for 
their addiction.  Officials in these courts also frequently have the authority to require 
mandatory drug testing post-adjudication.   
Drug courts carry the potential to satisfy all three desirable features of ATIs noted 
above.  There are a large number of drug-specific medical interventions that are known to be 
effective at curbing substance abuse, particularly for opioids – including methadone 
treatment, therapy, or detoxification – with clear medical protocols that can be applied in a 
consistent way by trained professionals.86  Moreover, in contrast to the early 1990s, public 
opinion in the US is increasingly in favor of reducing the number of drug offenders behind 
bars; contributing explanations for this shift in attitude include state decriminalization of 
marijuana possession, state-level fiscal concerns about correctional spending, and increased 
public concern about drug violations contributing to racial inequities in incarceration 
rates.  However, in practice, the ability of court officials to identify the set of people who will 
benefit from treatment seems to vary across contexts. 
Research indicates that drug courts that successfully require drug treatment for those 
who need it are effective at reducing crime.  A recent analysis of a nationally representative 
sample of offenders found that adults assigned to drug courts committed 52% fewer criminal 
acts and spent about 30 fewer days in prison over an eighteen-month period than otherwise 
similar adults.87 Of course, those who fail to complete the mandated drug treatment appear 
to recidivate at levels roughly equal to people in a control group, and a recent attempt by 
California to institute drug courts on a large scale essentially failed to reduce recidivism at 
all. Angela Hawken and Jeremy Grunert present evidence that not only were the California 
courts unable to successfully require that defendants complete treatment, the courts were 
essentially overwhelmed by the sheer number of defendants, and were unable to successfully 
match individuals with appropriate treatments.88  The California experience suggests that, 
in order to reduce crime, drug courts must effectively target treatment to addicts and other 
individuals who will respond to medical intervention. 
Other ATIs that are closely related to drug courts are intensive probation programs 
such as Hawaii’s Hope Probation and South Dakota’s 24/7 Sobriety Program.  In contrast to 
treatment-based approaches, these programs focus on using incentives to shape the 
behavioral choices of offenders.  Recent research suggests that, at least for many drug 
offenders, swift and certain but limited sanctions are both better deterrents and far less 
disruptive of inmates’ jobs, families, and communities.  Hope Probation is aimed at drug 
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offenders, whereas 24/7 Sobriety is focused on people convicted of DUIs.  In both, participants 
avoid jail time by submitting to either continual (24/7) or random (Hope Probation) 
biophysical testing, essentially requiring near total abstinence on the part of the offender.  
Participants who test positive for alcohol or drug use, via scientifically accepted metrics, are 
immediately incarcerated for a relatively short period of time, typically a few days. So long 
as the threats are immediate and predictably carried out, the threatened punishments can 
be modest. Evaluations of both programs have found substantially large reductions in 
recidivism, and in the case of 24/7 Sobriety, improved health outcomes.89  That said, with the 
experience of California in mind, both Hope Probation and 24/7 Sobriety should be replicated 
in larger courts before they are considered “proven.”  Moreover, intensive probation could in 
the future be used in concert with drug courts, with probation acting as a form of behavioral 
triage to separate those who are able to abstain by choice from those who require court-
directed medical intervention to overcome an addiction. 
 
B. Veteran’s Courts 
As of 2013, there are almost 200 courts in the US that are set up explicitly for 
veterans.90  Veteran’s courts typically operate on a separate docket from the general city, 
county, or state court and, in addition to standard legal counsel, employ a Veteran’s Justice 
Outreach (VJO) or community mentor to provide additional support for the defendant.91   
The underlying assumption justifying the use of veteran’s courts is that felony or 
misdemeanor behavior by veterans may be caused, at least in part, by an underlying mental 
health or substance abuse problem that is directly related to military service.  For example, 
a veteran may have committed an aggravated assault because of post-traumatic stress 
disorder resulting from a traumatic experience in active combat.  Homeless veterans may be 
accused of petty theft or vandalism, all of which may be the result of an undiagnosed 
traumatic brain injury sustained while deployed.  In such an instance, court-ordered mental 
health treatment, or simply connecting the veteran with appropriate services through the 
VJO can possibly meaningfully reduce recidivism. 
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There are important conceptual differences between drug courts and veteran’s courts.  
Veterans are diagnosed PTSD at almost four times the rate of the general population (30% 
vs. 8%), and have elevated rates of other mental health disorders.92  Thus, mental health 
concerns may more readily surface when the accused offender is a veteran.  However, 
compared to substance abuse, appropriate protocols for treating mental health issues like 
post-traumatic stress disorder or depression are less clearly defined; treatments vary from 
anger management therapy to anxiety medication.93 In other words, unlike requiring 
someone addicted to opiates to undergo suboxone therapy, a commonly agreed-upon 
treatment, there is less consensus within the psychotherapy community regarding the most 
appropriate pathways to improve mental health.94        
To date, there are no large scale evaluations of the cost effectiveness of veteran’s 
courts compared with the traditional criminal justice system, and there is also only scant 
empirical evidence on the post-adjudication outcomes for those involved.95  This does not 
mean that veteran’s courts are not a promising approach to reducing both criminal justice 
expenditure and crime, but that they are simply too new for long-term outcomes to yet be 
meaningfully understood.  Moreover, unlike drug users, veterans have historically been 
perceived by the public as deserving of special treatment, meaning that these alternate 
justice systems are likely to remain politically feasible to implement.  
  
C. Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice relies heavily on the individual victim in the determination of what 
punishment, if any, a convicted offender receives.  Local community members who are 
respected by both the offenders and victims are also frequently involved.96  In such a system, 
the victim and offender participate in a series of mediation sessions, during which the parties 
reach an agreement about steps an offender will take to compensate the victim for the offense.  
These steps can include apologizing, participating in some sort of community outreach 
program, or directly compensating the victim for a financial loss. Cases which cannot be 
resolved are refereed back to the court system.97  
Perhaps because of its focus on rehabilitation, restorative justice approaches to 
punishment are more common among juveniles, and a meta-analysis of 36 studies of 
Restorative Justice programs conducted for the UK Home Office found that, overall, offenders 
involved in these programs did no worse than offenders sentenced through in traditional 
criminal justice courts.  Further, victims appeared to be more satisfied with the final case 
outcome.98  
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That said, researchers found a fair amount of variation in these effects, and it can be 
difficult to identify when, exactly, a restorative justice approach will be successful  On 
average, violent offenders appear to be more responsive than those who committed property 
crimes, but even then restorative justice appears to be less effective at reducing future 
criminal behavior among people who Lawrence Sherman and Heather Strang refer to as 
“defiant,” a classification which may be difficult for practitioners to use to screen 
defendants.99 
Advocates of restorative justice argue that directly involving victims, offenders, and 
community members can reduce both perceived and actual racial disparities in the justice 
system, as all parties involved should agree to the outcome of a case.100 However, empirical 
evidence on the effects of these programs on attitudes towards justice system fairness 
remains limited, and it is unclear whether such programs could operate at a scale sufficient 
to impact racial disparities at an aggregate level.  Sherman and Strang note that all of the 
restorative justice programs they reviewed encompassed a small number of participants, and 
it is possible that scaling up these programs would produce very different outcomes.101     
 
In summary, to be viable, ATI programs should be targeted at populations that will 
respond to scientifically sound treatments, and must be able to produce statistics that 
demonstrate their efficacy to a sometimes skeptical public.  Among three common ATI 
programs, drug courts, veteran’s courts, and restorative justice, drug courts are the most 
extensively studied, and also are able to impose sanctions that have the firmest basis in 
science. Currently, public attitudes towards drug users are softening, making this a viable 
option for local jurisdictions.  Veteran’s courts are targeted at a population that is generally 
viewed as deserving of special treatment, but it is less clear that an appropriate therapeutic 
treatment exists in all cases.  Restorative justice appears to be promising on a small scale, 
but like veteran’s courts there are no large scale evaluations of the efficacy of this ATI at 
reducing recidivism or justice costs.       
 
Contribution to Racial Disparities and Inaccuracies in Criminal Justice 
 
By design, people who commit the same offense may receive different punishments in 
jurisdictions that use ATI based on some assessment of the why that person engaged in crime. 
There is an unavoidable tension between individually-tailored criminal justice solutions and 
concerns about fairness which any jurisdiction using an ATI must try to balance.  Failure to 
achieve proper balance can lead to real concerns about corruption, discrimination, and 
unequal justice, or, alternatively, produce a system that does not adequately respond to the 
unique underlying reasons someone has committed a harmful act.  Because ATI systems 
increase the variation in potential punishments that offenders can receive, utmost care must 
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be used to ensure that access to ATI is based on objective and verifiable treatment goals, 
rather than simply offering special consideration for a particular favored group.   
When properly implemented, specialized courts offer the potential of actually reducing 
racial disparities within the criminal justice system. This is because minorities are often 
overrepresented among the target populations for these programs: those arrested for low-
level drug offenses and, in some communities, veterans.102  Diverting offenders to treatment, 
when successful, can allow these populations to avoid developing criminal records and 
suffering the other adverse ancillary consequences of repeated contact with the criminal 
justice system.  The extent to which restorative justice initiatives affect racial disparities, if 
at all, depends on the specifics of the particular program. 
 
Avenues for Reform 
 
1. Establish objective, needs-based criteria for participation in specialized courts, 
and collect and analyze demographic data on participants.  
 
Delaware has been a leader in developing and expanding specialized courts, and 
already has operational drug courts and veteran’s courts in the state.  To ensure that these 
specialized courts to the extent possible reduce rather than exacerbate racial disparities, the 
courts should collect and assess data on demographics of participants on an ongoing basis. 
Policies and practices regarding the process for determining who is assigned to ATI 
can influence these programs’ impact on disparities.  To the extent that decisions regarding 
diversion are determined primarily by individual decision-makers such as prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges, the system is open to possible influence from real or implicit 
bias.  Similarly, determining eligibility based pre-existing characteristics such as prior 
criminal record or ability to pay for treatment that have been shown to exhibit  race/ethnic 
disparities increases the likelihood that ATI will become a tool that increases rather than 
decreases disparity.  While many practical considerations must govern eligibility factors, 
from the perspective of mitigating disparity, an approach that defaults to ATI for low-level 
offenses, offers ATI without reference to income, and determines eligibility based upon race-
neutral factors such as clinical history seems most desirable. 
When appropriately targeted, specialized courts offer the potential to increase public 
safety by addressing substance abuse or mental illness before these problems spiral into 
violence or more serious felonies.  These programs need not exacerbate racial disparities, 
and, when ably implemented, can actually serve to reduce disparities. 
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V. Non-Criminal Justice Policies 
 
A comprehensive treatment of the enormous body of research discussing social and 
environmental contributors to racial disparities in crime is beyond the scope of this 
memorandum.  However, clearly there are numerous root cause factors outside of the direct 
control of the criminal justice system that can fuel disparities.  This section summarizes some 
of the current research on three types of non-criminal justice programs that likely impact 
crime: social insurance (including job training), investments in infrastructure, and education.  
These represent three domains where recent advances in the research knowledge base 
suggest possible new approaches to addressing the problem of racial disparities in criminal 
involvement. 
 
A. Social Insurance and Job Training 
A growing body of highly credible empirical research demonstrates that reducing 
household financial strain, especially if accomplished by improving employment outcomes, 
reduces recipients’ criminal behavior.   
Evidence from the UK, which dramatically reduced unemployment insurance 
generosity in 1996, demonstrates that lessening the amount of time someone can claim 
unemployment benefits and making it more difficult for individuals to receive any benefits 
at all can increase crime.103 In the US, the impact of welfare reform on crime appears to be 
multilayered, as changes in benefits have historically been accompanied by an increase in 
either job training or additional work incentives like the Earned Income Tax Credit.  Price 
Fishback et al. show that work programs in the New Deal were associated with substantial 
reductions in crime, more so than programs which simply provided families with cash 
assistance.104  Hope Corman et al. present evidence that work incentives put in place by the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1994 reduced the rate 
at which women were arrested for property offenses by roughly 5%.105  General changes in 
the low-wage labor market in the UK are associated with changes in crime as well.106 
While these studies have focused on adult crime, there is some evidence that 
promoting employment opportunities for young people can have similar behavioral effects. 
Sara Heller tracks the arrest records of at risk youth who are enrolled in a summer jobs 
program, and demonstrates that individuals randomly assigned to summer jobs are 
substantially less likely to be involved in acts of violence, even during the school year.107 
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B. Infrastructure Improvements 
Government actions that affect the physical environment can also generate 
meaningful changes in criminal behavior. Although the “broken windows” theory of crime 
has been criticized due to its potential to promote over-policing of young men of color108, quasi-
experimental evaluations of literal broken windows policies show promise.  Kondo et al. 
followed crime patterns in the vicinity of blighted Philadelphia homes that were, or were not, 
given surface improvements such as replacing boarded up windows with plexiglass.109  Crime 
in areas that were given touch-ups fell relative to otherwise similar neighborhoods where no 
such work was done.  A similar Philadelphia program aimed at cleaning up or greening 
vacant lots was also associated with statistically significant reductions in gun violence, 
vandalism, and in intensity of resident’s concerns about crime.110 Researchers have also 
found that crime increased in close proximity to homes that are foreclosed upon during the 
Great Recession.111 
Governments can also encourage private real estate developers to reduce social 
disorder by providing incentives for urban renewal.  The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program provides state 
governments with funding to pay for tax credits that are awarded to developers who construct 
or rehabilitate rental housing for low income residents.  Developers who make investments 
in the housing stock in low income neighborhoods, areas identified as Qualified Census Tracts 
(QCTs), are awarded credits that are 30% larger.  Matthew Freedman and Emily Owens 
showed that crime fell in counties where developers built more new low-income housing in 
QCTs, rather than wealthier areas.112 They attribute this empirical finding to the fact that 
the new developments in QCTs represent improvements in the quality of the physical 
environment, whereas new developments in less-poor areas are less likely to replace 
dilapidated or abandoned structures.   
Improving the housing stock may also reduce crime when it reduces childhood 
exposure to intoxicants, particularly lead.  Jessica Reye points out that states where were 
more aggressive in limiting the use of lead paint and leaded gasoline in the 1970s and 1980s 
saw larger declines in violent crime in the 1990s, when cohorts of individuals exposed to the 
improvements were entering their higher crime years.113 
It is important to note that reducing social disorder in a blighted area is not the same 
thing as providing an incentive for people living in blighted areas to move; evidence from the 
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Moving to Opportunity Experiment, which provided housing vouchers and search assistance 
to low income residents in cities across the US found a mixed impact on crime- in fact, boys 
who were moved to better neighborhoods were more likely to be involved in property crime 
than those who did randomly receive housing vouchers, although there were slightly less 
likely to engage in violent crime.114   
Finally, investments in transportation infrastructure can affect the criminal 
environment in ways that reduce social harm.  C. Kirabo Jackson and Emily Owens analyzed 
arrests made by the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Force during the early 2000s, a 
period during which the Metro Rail (the local subway system) expanded its late night 
operating hours from 12 am to 3 am.115 They found that this increase in public transportation 
was associated with small increases in arrests for minor offenses, like vandalism and simple 
assault, but reductions in the rate of drunk driving- arguably a more serious and socially 
costly crime than the offenses that became more prevalent.  This reduction in drunk driving 
was particularly salient once the implied increase in alcohol consumption in bars and 
restaurants was taken into account, and was most evident in neighborhoods were bars were 
located in close proximity to Metro stations.   
 
C. Education 
Education and crime are intrinsically linked.  There is a persistent and strong 
negative relationship between the number of years that someone stays in school and their 
involvement with the criminal justice system.  This pattern likely reflects a bi-directional 
relationship--more education likely causes a person to commit fewer crimes in the future, 
while involvement in the criminal justice system also disrupts the educational process.116 
The best evidence on the impact of education on crime has come from studies of 
mandatory schooling laws, which increased the number of years of schooling that children 
were required to complete before dropping out.  Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti and 
Stephen Machin et al. show that such “shocks” to the education attainment of young people 
area associated with reduced criminal participation in the US and UK, respectively.117 The 
underlying mechanism here appears to be that the longer period of schooling increases the 
general productivity (or “human capital”) or the affected individuals, allowing them to earn 
higher wages, making crime less attractive. 
                                                          
114 Jens Ludwig, Greg Duncan, & Paul Hirschfield, Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from a 
Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment, 116 Q. J. ECON. 655 (2001); Jens Ludwig & Jeffrey Kling, Is Crime 
Contagious?, 50 J. LAW & ECON. 491 (2007).  
115 C. Kirabo Jackson & Emily Owens, One for the Road: Public Transportation, Alcohol Consumption, and 
Intoxicated Driving, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 106 (2010). 
116 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich, “On the Relation Between Education and Crime,” in EDUCATION, INCOME, AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 313 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1975); Randi Hjalmarsson, Criminal Justice Involvement 
and High School Completion, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 613 (2008); Micahel Lovenheim & Emily Owens, Does Federal 
Financial Aid Affect College Enrollment? Evidence from Drug Offenders and the Higher Education Act of 1998, 8 
J. URBAN ECON. 1 (2014). 
117 Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, 
and Self-Reports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 155 (2004); Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie. & S. Vujic, The Crime Reducing 
Effect of Education, 121 ECON. J. 463 (2011). 
 
 
Of course, school also has an incapacitative effect on crime; Brian Jacob and Lars 
Lefgren show that juveniles are more likely to be involved in property crimes on teacher 
planning days, when school is out of session in the middle of the week.118  Similar increases 
in property crime are observed during teacher’s strikes.119  Nevertheless, violent crimes 
involving youth appear to fall when school is out of session; school serves as a meeting place 
for students, and can actually increase inter-personal conflict.120 
Finally, there is strong evidence that which school a child attends can affect their 
criminal involvement.  Historically, counties which were forced to desegregate their public 
school systems experienced lower homicide rates in subsequent years.121 The reverse also 
seems to hold--Stephen Billings et al. find that increased school segregation that followed the 
end of intra-county busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg in 2001 was associated with an increase 
in crimes committed by non-white men.122 Additional research on school quality suggests the 
mechanism here may be a reduction in the rigor of schools the minority students attended 
after the end of busing; students who were able to attend selective charter schools in Chicago 
via lottery were substantially less likely to be arrested than otherwise identical students who 
received low lottery numbers.123 David Deming found that similar lottery winners in North 
Carolina were less likely to be incarcerated in their adult years as well, implying that having 
the opportunity to go to a more selective school can have long run impacts on an individual’s 
criminal involvement.124 
 
Emerging new high-quality empirical evidence indicates that investments in 
education, public infrastructure, and social welfare programs that help people get back to 
work can reduce criminal behavior.  To the extent that such investments are targeted towards 
disadvantaged communities, they offer potential for reducing racial disparities at the front 
end of the system by lowering the criminal involvement of minorities. Moreover, such non-
criminal justice interventions might reduce disparities while enhancing overall public safety. 
However, for the most part, the impacts of these programs on crime tend to be small compared 
to impact of criminal justice interventions.  Moreover, the cost of educational and 
infrastructure improvements can be high, such initiatives may have limited political support, 
and the details of how programs are carried out matter.  Nevertheless, there are many other 
social benefits associated with improving public transportation or providing high quality 
public education beyond crime reduction and diminishment of racial disparity.  In addition, 
addressing disparities by improving the quality of schools or housing for low-income 
                                                          
118 Brian Jacob & Lars Lefgren, Are Idle Hands the Devil’s Workshop? Incapacitation, Concentration and 
Juvenile Crime. 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1560 (2003).  
119 Jeremy Luallen, School's Out…Forever: A Study of Juvenile Crime, At-Risk Youths and Teacher Strikes, 59 J. 
URBAN ECON. 75 (2006).  
120 See Jacob and Lefgren, supra note 118. 
121 D.A. Weiner, Byron Lutz & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of School Desegregation on Crime (NBER Working 
Paper No. 15380, 2009). 
122 Stephen Billings, David Deming, & Jonah Rockoff, School Segregation, Educational Attainment, and Crime: 
Evidence from the End of Busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 129 Q. J. ECON. 435 (2014).  
123 Julie Cullen, Brian Jacob, & Steven Levitt, The Effect of School Choice on Participants: Evidence from 
Randomized Lotteries, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1191 (2006).  
124 David Deming, Better Schools, Less Crime?, 126 Q. J. ECON. 2063 (2011).  
 
 
individuals does not generate the additional ancillary social costs that fall on the families 
and loved ones of incarcerated criminals.   
 
 
 
Appendix A: Recent Examples of Courts’ Use of Data to Understand Racial 
Disparities in Police Stop and Search Behavior 
 
A number of large city police departments have collected data relating to pedestrian 
stops, and in some locations, courts and scholars have measured compliance with the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment standards.  A review of these efforts illustrates how courts can 
use data to better understand racial disparities, and, where needed, craft appropriate 
measures to diminish disparity. 
 
I. Los Angeles 
 
As a result of a number of high visibility problems in the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice initiated an investigation of policing practices.  In 2002 a consent 
decree was entered between DOJ and Los Angeles setting forth a number of reforms within 
the police department, including collection of data on car and pedestrian stops.1  In 2008, 
Professor Ian Ayres published a study in which he analyzed the stops to determine possible 
race effects.2  The study reported: 
 
1. African Americans were much more likely to be stopped than non-minorities.  
There were more than 4,500 stops for every 10,000 African American residents, 
but only 1,750 stops for every 10,000 non-minority residents.  In two divisions 
(Central and Hollywood), there were more stops of African Americans in one year 
than there were African American residents. 
2. The racial disparity was not the result of differing crime rates.  In regressions 
controlling for both violent and property crime rates, the stop rate per 10,000 
residents was more than 3,400 stops higher for African Americans and more than 
350 stops higher for Hispanics than for non-minorities. 
3. The disparity in the likelihood of being stopped was not driven by a policy of 
assigning more police to minority neighborhoods.  Indeed, the racial disparity in 
stop rates was higher in non-minority neighborhoods than in minority 
neighborhoods. 
4. Large racial disparities were estimated with regard to specific police investigative 
techniques. 
a. Stopped African Americans were 166% more likely and Hispanics were 132% 
more likely to be asked to exit vehicles than stopped whites. 
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b. Stopped African Americans were 127% more likely and Hispanics were 43% 
more likely to be frisked or patted down than stopped whites. 
c. Stopped African Americans were 76% more likely and stopped Hispanics were 
more than 16% more likely to be asked to consent to being searched than 
stopped whites. 
5. Stops of African Americans were less productive than the stops of whites.  Stopped 
African Americans were 21% more likely to be stopped without being either cited 
or arrested thus suggesting that police required less justification to stop African 
Americans than to stop whites. 
6. Searches and frisks of African Americans and Hispanics were systematically less 
productive in producing weapons, drugs or other contraband than those conducted 
upon whites: 
a. Searched African Americans were 37% less likely than searched whites to 
be found with weapons, 24% less likely to be found with drugs, and 25% 
likely to be found with other contraband.  
b. Searched Hispanics were 33% less likely than searched whites to be found 
with weapons, 34% less likely to found with drugs, and 12% less likely to 
be found with other contraband. 
c. Frisked African Americans were 42% less likely than frisked whites to be 
found with weapons, 25% less likely to be found with drugs, and 33% less 
likely to be found with other contraband.  
d. Frisked Hispanics were 32% less likely than frisked whites to be found with 
weapons, 38% less likely to be found with drugs, and 15% less likely to be 
found with other contraband.  
 
Based on this data and statistical analysis, Professor Ayres concluded that “it is 
implausible that higher frisk and search rates were justified by higher minority criminality, 
when these frisks and searches were less likely to uncover . . . contraband.”3 
 
II. New York City 
 
In New York City, stop and frisk practices have generated strong political debate and 
significant litigation.  A decision in a highly contested civil rights lawsuit, Floyd v. City of 
New York,4 found that the City had a municipal policy and practice that violated both the 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibition on racial discrimination.  In a 
separate remedial order, the court appointed a monitor to assist in the implementation of the 
broad equitable relief necessary to remedy the long-standing and pervasive constitutional 
violations.   
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 From January 2004 through June, 2012, the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) made 4.4 million pedestrian stops in New York City, of which over 80% were of 
African-Americans or Latinos.  More than half of those stopped were also subjected to a frisk.  
Floyd presented a challenge to these stop and frisk practices on two grounds. First, that many 
were conducted without the requisite reasonable suspicion and, therefore, violated the 
Fourth Amendment.   Second, that the disparity in stops based on race were not explained 
by non-racial factors and therefore the statistical and other evidence, including stated 
practices in the NYPD, proved a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 The court found the following facts after a several-week trial:   
 
1. Between January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million stops. 
2. The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of 
686,000 in 2011. 
3. 52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons.  A weapon was 
found in 1.5% of these frisks.  In other words, in 98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks, no 
weapon was found. 
4. 6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons.  The 
remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement 
action. 
5. In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black, in 31% the person 
was Hispanic, and in 10% the person was white.  In 2010, New York City’s resident 
population was roughly 23% black, 29% Hispanic, and 33% white 
6. In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the officer recorded 
using force.  The number for whites was 17%. 
7. Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the stops of Hispanics, 
and 1.4% of the stops of whites. 
 
 On the issue of Fourth Amendment compliance, only 12% of all stops resulted in an 
arrest or citation, some which were unrelated to the reason for the stop.  While courts have 
generally refused to quantify the level of proof necessary for a finding of probable cause (for 
arrests and searches) or for reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow a stop or frisk, the low 
“hit-rate” in New York City has been interpreted by many to be far below any normatively 
reasonable assessment of the evidence or facts necessary for an intrusive stop and frisk.5  In 
particular, the low rate of seizure of guns raised questions regarding the validity of the factors 
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upon which police rely in frisking for guns; from the data the supposed “tell-tale” signs of a 
weapon are very poor predictors of possession.6   
 On the race discrimination claim, the court first had to decide which of the competing 
“benchmarks” used by the experts provided the best statistical approach on the issue of 
possible racial profiling.  Dr. Fagan used population and reported crime as benchmarks for 
understanding the racial distribution of stops.  The City proposed a benchmark consisting of 
the rates at which various races appear in suspect description from crime victims (“suspect 
race description data”).  According to the City, the fact that blacks and Hispanics represented 
87% of persons stopped in 2011 and 2012 was not disproportionate given that 83% of all 
known crime suspects and 90% of all know violent crime suspects were black and Hispanic.7   
 The court found that the City’s assumption that the racial distribution of stopped 
pedestrians will resemble the racial distribution of the local criminal population, even if “the 
people stopped are not criminals” to be flawed.8  Given that nearly 90% of all persons stopped 
were not involved in criminal conduct (and only 13% of those stopped were done so pursuant 
to a specific suspect description), the court concluded that crime suspect data may serve as a 
proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior, but not for innocent persons, 
particularly where the “behavior” descriptions are so vague and often consistent with 
innocence.9  Moreover, one would expect that a racially neutral practice would result in equal 
stop rates by race of innocent persons (90% of those stopped in New York City) as it is highly 
unlikely that innocent Blacks who are stopped are exhibiting more criminal like behavior 
than Whites.10 
 Based on regression analysis—a statistical methodology that seeks to determine 
whether a measurable relationship exists between an explanatory factor (e.g. race) and an 
outcome (e.g. probability of a stop or a search) holding constant other relevant factors--the 
court determined that several factors supported a finding of intentional race discrimination.  
First, more stops were made of blacks and Hispanics, and even when other relevant variables 
were held constant, the best predictor of stops was the racial composition of the precinct or 
census tract.  Second, regardless of the racial composition of the geographic areas, blacks and 
Hispanics were more likely to be stopped (again holding other variables constant), even in 
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predominantly white areas.  Third, blacks and minorities were 30% more likely to be 
arrested, as opposed to receiving a summons (holding variables constant).  Fourth, blacks 
and Hispanics were 14% more likely to be subjected to the use of force during the stop.  And 
fifth, the hit rate for blacks and Hispanics as measured by further law enforcement action 
following a stop and/or frisk was 8% lower for blacks and Hispanics, thereby indicating that 
they are being targeted for stops based on lesser degree of objectively-founded suspicion.11  
 Beyond the statistical evidence, the court found evidence of intentional discrimination 
through an examination of “institutional evidence,” and specifically the deliberate 
indifference of the NYPD to patterns of racial discrimination in stop and frisk practices.  
Patterns of race discrimination were known to the NYPD as early as 1999 when the State 
Attorney General issued a report on stop and frisk practices that documented unexplained 
racial disparities in stops.  Further, the NYPD put great pressure on commanders and others 
in the chain of command (down to patrol officers) to increase the number of stops (from 97,000 
in 2002 to 686,000 in 2011), but that the NYPD failed to audit the stops in a manner that 
would examine possible racial discrimination.  There was also evidence that officers were 
encouraged to make stops based on racial characteristics or stereotypes, and in some cases 
direct orders to the target the “right people,” which was understood to mean Blacks and 
Hispanics since it was young men of color who were committing violent crimes most often.     
 
III. Philadelphia 
 
 In 2009, Mayor Michael Nutter implemented a plan to increase stop and frisks to 
combat high levels of murder and other violent crime.  Over the next two years, stops 
increased by almost 30%, and in the 2009-2011 period approximately 260,000 stops of 
pedestrians were recorded on an annual basis. Given that the population of Philadelphia at 
that time was approximately 1.6 million persons, the rate of pedestrian stops was higher 
than that in New York City. 
 In 2011, in a class action lawsuit filed against the City of Philadelphia, alleging Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the parties agreed to a Consent Decree that required 
the City to conduct stops and frisks within constitutional limits, prohibited stops and frisks 
without reasonable suspicion (specifying certain conduct that did not establish reasonable 
suspicion, such as “loitering” “high crime areas” “disturbances” and “furtive movements”), 
prohibited the use of race as a basis for a stop except in cases of suspect identifications by 
race, mandated the creation of an electronic data base of all stops and frisks with relevant 
information as to each stop, provided for the appointment of a monitor, and established a 
monitoring and auditing process under which plaintiffs’ counsel and the monitor would have 
access to all relevant data and information. 12   
From 2010 to 2012, the number of stops dropped to approximately 215,000 per year.  
However, the high rate of impermissible stops and frisks has persisted.  In a report filed with 
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the court that analyzed stops and frisks for the first six months of 2014, the following matters 
were documented with respect to Fourth Amendment issues:   
    
1. 37% of all stops were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion.  
Significantly, the Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) audits show similar 
rates of stops without reasonable suspicion:  the audits for the first two quarters 
of 2014 by the PPD show patrol officer stops without reasonable suspicion at 39% 
and 29%, respectively.  These results show very modest improvement from the 
previous data reviews (that showed impermissible stops at 40-50%), but tens of 
thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year without 
reasonable suspicion.   
2. 39% of all frisks were made without reasonable suspicion and an additional 14% 
were made in cases where the stop itself was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
3. Contraband of any kind was recovered in only 60 stops (2.5 % of all stops) and 5 
guns were seized (0.2 % of all stops).  Arrests occurred in 7.5% of all stops, 
excluding arrests made on probable cause even before a stop or frisk was 
conducted.   
4. Of 442 frisks, only 2 weapons were seized and contraband other than weapons was 
seized in only 19 other frisks; in over 95% of all frisks, no evidence was seized.  In 
131 incidents where police reported that the suspect was armed or involved in a 
violent crime, a weapon was recovered in only 2 cases.   
5. Of 211stops in which guns or gun-related activity is referenced as a basis for the 
stop, there were no frisks recorded on 80 stops, or 38% of the total.   
 
The very low hit-rates raise concerns that stops and frisks are not being conducted 
based upon a legally sufficient level of suspicion.  Focusing on frisks only, where it would be 
expected that there would be the opportunity for recovery of weapons or other contraband in 
many cases, since the officer claims to have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed, 
the rate of recovery of weapons is vanishingly small.  Moreover, the fact that many stops 
reportedly based on concerns about weapons do not result in frisks raises serious questions 
as to whether the police are accurately reporting what they observe, and whether their 
proxies for weapon possession are appropriate. 
With respect to racial effects, the data showed that in all districts, Blacks and 
minorities account for a higher share of stops than they do in the population; in some 
districts, they are stopped at a rate over 5 times their share of the population. Thus, in the 
7th Police District, where the population is 5% Black, 25% of the stops were of Blacks and in 
the 9th District where the population is 11% Black, 69% of the stops were of Blacks. By 
contrast, in the 22d Police District, where Blacks make up 89% of the population, the ratio of 
stops by race was close to a 1:1 ratio.   
Approximately 11.3 more Black individuals were stopped than White individuals for 
every 10,000 residents of a district. After appropriate statistical adjustments, this difference 
 
 
translates to an expected disparity in annual stops citywide of approximately 73,600, or 34% 
of the total annual stops. 
Raw data establishing disparate rates of stops and frisks by race do not demonstrate 
that disparities arise due to racial bias.  Regression analysis offer one tool for assessing 
whether disparities can be explained by non-racial causative factors, such as demographic 
makeup and crimes rates by district.  Applying regression analysis to the Philadelphia data 
and controlling for detainee age, Latino identity, district racial composition, employment 
rates, sources of information for the stops, the share of the male population under 24, and 
prior year district crime rates indicates that districts with higher crime rates have more 
stops, but accounting for these other factors can eliminate the racial effects seen in the raw 
population and stop data.  
The Philadelphia data indicate that the frisk rate for Black detainees is 7.5– 9.5 
percentage points higher than for Whites. Since the pedestrian frisk rate for Whites is 9.7%, 
this translates to an increased likelihood of 75% to almost 100% that Black detainees are 
frisked relative to Whites. Using regression analysis to account for factors such as age, 
district demographic variables, or crime rates demonstrates a robust pattern of racial 
disparity that cannot be attributed to these additional non-race factors. 
The data also demonstrate significant variation by race in the share of stops lacking 
reasonable suspicion, which ranged from 32% for Whites to 39% for Blacks to 41% for Latinos. 
There is a 29% higher unfounded stop rate for Latinos and 21% higher rate for Blacks relative 
to Whites.   
As noted above, an important measure of the propriety of stops and frisks—both as to 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues--is the rate at which they lead to the discovery 
of contraband, and particularly weapons, since frisks are permitted only where the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous.  Moreover, seizures of weapons 
are often cited as justification for a robust stop and frisk program. 
In Philadelphia, fewer than 1 in 200 pedestrian frisks yielded a firearm. Including 
other weapons raises the overall rate of detection of weapons to only 0.92%. None of the frisks 
of Whites yielded firearms and 1 of the 47 frisks yielded other weapons.  By comparison the 
333 frisks of Blacks yielded 2 firearms and 1 other weapon. Although the racial differences 
in hit-rates are not statistically significant, this is unsurprising given the rarity with which 
firearms are interdicted. 
Drugs were detected in about 1 in 60 frisks, including 1.75% of frisks of Black 
pedestrians, 2.13% of Whites, and 0% of Latinos.  These patterns do not suggest that 
minorities possess drugs more frequently than Whites; indeed, the data points in the opposite 
direction. Further, although suspicion of drug activity may be grounds for a stop, a frisk may 
not be undertaken in a search for drugs and many of the “stops” for narcotics-related conduct 
that are recorded by police are actually arrests based on probable cause (e.g., observed drug 
transactions).  
Although it remains to be seen how courts will ultimately interpret the developing 
evidence from Philadelphia discussed above, clearly the availability of data covering searches 
 
 
and their outcomes by race affords the courts very valuable information on the nature and 
potential explanations for disparities. 
 
